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CONFLICT OF LAWS-LIBERATIVE PRESCRIPTION
Issues of liberative prescription, in conflict of laws cases are cur-
rently resolved in Louisiana on the basis of paragraph 6 of article 10
of the Civil Code which states: "The prescription provided by the
laws of this state applies to an obligation arising under the laws of
another jurisdiction which is sought to be enforced in this state." 2
Under this provision, a cause of action that arises in another state,
but is sued upon in Louisiana,3 will be subjected to the prescriptive
period provided by Louisiana law regardless of the length of the
limitation period of the other state. This means that, if the cause of
action has prescribed under Louisiana law, the action will be dismissed
even if the limitation period provided by the other state has not
expired. 4 Conversely, an action timely filed according to Louisiana
law will be entertained by Louisiana courts although the underlying
cause of action is barred where it arose. 5
Copyright 1987, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. "Liberative prescription is a mode of barring of actions as a result of inaction
for a period of time." La. Civ. Code art. 3447. Liberative prescription and peremption
are two types of statutes of limitations under Louisiana law. See generally Comment,
Legal Rights and the Passage of Time, 41 La. L. Rev. 220 (1980). Peremption is
discussed infra at text accompanying notes 26-27.
2. La. Civ. Code art. 10 para. 6. For the historical development of this paragraph,
see infra notes 6 & 8 and accompanying text.
3. Under Klaxon v. Stentor Elec, Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 61 S. Ct. 1020 (1941),
a federal court is bound by the conflict of law rules of the state in which it is sitting.
Therefore, the federal courts and the state courts in Louisiana follow the same conflict
of laws rules.
4. See, e.g., Shaw v. Ferguson, 437 So. 2d 319, 321 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1983);
Davis v. Colvin, 410 So. 2d 1211, 1212 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982). This result conforms
with the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 142(1) (1971) [hereinafter Res-
tatement (Second)] ("An action will not be maintained if it is barred by the statute
of limitations of the forum, including a provision borrowing the statute of limitations
of another state."), and with the Restatement of Conflict of Laws § 603 (1934)
[hereinafter Restatement] ("If action is barred by the statute of limitations of the
forum, no cause of action can be maintained though action is not barred in the state
where the cause of action arose.").
5. But see La. Civ. Code art. 10 para. 7, discussed at infra text accompanying
notes 42-47. This use of the forum's longer limitation period conforms with the
Restatement and the Restatement (Second). Restatement § 604 provides: "If action is
not barred by the statute of limitations of the forum, an action can be maintained,
though action is barred in the state where the cause of action arose." Similarly,
Restatement (Second) § 142(2) states: "An action will be maintained if it is not barred
by the statute of limitations of the forum, even though it would be barred by the
statute of limitations of another state." See Roper v. Monroe Grocer Co., 171 La.
181, 129 So. 811, 812 (1930).
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Louisiana adopted this choice-of-law rule, legislatively and judi-
cially, long ago. In 1825, the Louisiana Legislature enacted it in article
13 of the Louisiana Code of Practice.6 Three years later, when faced
with the issue of prescription with regard to a New York contract,
the Louisiana Supreme Court, without referring to article 13, stated:
"The laws of the place of contract, in relation to limitation or pre-
scription, must be left out of view. . . . The doctrine appears to be
fully established that the lex fori alone governs in respect to such
matters." ' 7 Currently, the legislative authority for this choice-of-law
rule is found in paragraph 6 of Civil Code article 10, which was
redesignated. from Civil Code article 3532 in 1983.8 Although criticized
by most modern choice-of-law commentators, 9 this general rule that
the forum's law governs liberative prescription is currently followed
in most states.' 0 In recent years, however, some states have abandoned
this mechanical rule in favor of alternatives that allow for more
responsive and rational decisions."
This article will evaluate the current Louisiana choice-of-law po-
sition on liberative prescription and assess the need for Louisiana to
join the developing trend in this area of the law. First, the traditional
choice-of-law theory on liberative prescription will be reviewed. Then,
the alternatives developed under modern choice-of-law methodologies
will be analyzed. Finally, recommendations concerning Louisiana's
approach to resolving conflicts of prescriptive laws will be presented.
6. "The forms, the effects, and the prescription of actions are governed by the
law of the place where they are brought .... This article, along with the rest of
the Code of Practice of 1825, was repealed in 1960 by Act 15 which enacted the
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure. Regarding the repeal of the Code of Practice, one
court noted: "The repeal of Article 13 and the fact that its substance was not reenacted
elsewhere should not affect the result here, because it is clear . . . that no substantive
change was intended." Martin v. Texaco, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 1015, 1016 n.2 (E. D.
La. 1968). Although Act 15 did not reenact the substance of article 13, the court
apparently overlooked Act 30 of the same year which did reproduce at least part of
the substance of article 13 by amending Civil Code article 3532. See infra note 8.
7. Union Cotton Manufactory v. Lobdell, 7 Mart. (n.s.) 108, 108 (La. 1828).
8. Act 30 of 1960 amended article 353Z of the Civil Code to include: "The
prescription provided by the laws of this state applies to an obligation arising under
the laws of another jurisdiction which is sought to be enforced in this state." This
clause was redesignated as an undesignated paragraph of article 10 by Act 173 of
1983.
9. See, e.g., R. Leflar, American Conflicts Law § 127, at 252 (3d ed. 1977); A.
Ehrenzweig, Conflict of Laws 428 (1962); Grossman, Statutes of Limitations and the
Conflict of Laws: Modern Analysis, 1980 Ariz. St. L.J. 1; Milhollin, Interest Analysis
and Conflicts Between Statutes of Limitations, 27 Hastings L.J. 1 (1975).
10. See authorities cited supra in note 9.
I. See infra text accompanying notes 72-119 for a discussion of some of these
alternatives.
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TRADITIONAL THEORY 12
The General Rule
Traditionally, American courts followed the general rule that lib-
erative prescription is governed by the law of the forum. 3 This choice
of the forum's limitation laws stems from the more general conflicts
principle that issues of procedure are governed by the law of the
forum. 4 According to this principle, when a court presented with a
conflict of laws case determines that another state's law should control,
the court will apply the substantive aspects of the foreign law, but
will rely on its own laws for procedural matters. Although civil law
jurisdictions generally regard liberative prescription as a substantive
issue, 5 Louisiana adheres to the common law view that prescription
is a procedural issue 16 which is therefore governed by the law of the
12. Under the traditional theory, each conflict of laws case was classified according
to specific legal categories, such as tort or contract. Based on the characterization of
the case, the court would apply the substantive law of the state chosen in accordance
with certain a priori rules. For example, tort actions were generally controlled by the
law of the place of injury. Restatement § 378 (lex loci delicti). Contract actions were
governed by the law of the place of contracting. Id. §§ 311 & 332 (lex loci contractus).
This traditional approach often produced anomalous results because it failed to consider
the interests of the involved states or the purposes underlying the conflicting laws.
13. Restatement (Second) § 142; Restatement §§ 603, 604; see also authorities cited
supra in note 9.
14. Restatement § 585 ("All matters of procedure are governed by the law of the
forum."). See also Scharff v. Cameron Offshore Servs., 475 F. Supp. 48, 50 (W.D.
La. 1979), where the court stated:
[Elven if the forum determines that reference should be made to some foreign
law, such reference is only to matters of "substance" while all matters of
"procedure" are still governed by the law of the forum. As with other
problems of characterization, the determination and delineation of what con-
stitutes "substance" and what constitutes "procedure" is made by the forum
in its own terms and according to its own standards.
15. E.g., Note, The Statute of Limitations and the Conflict of Laws, 28 Yale
L.J. 492 (1919); Comment, Conflict of Law: Statutes of Limitation in the Multistate
Product Liability Case, 48 Tul. L. Rev. 1130, 1134 (1974); Pritchard v. Norton, 106
U.S. 124, 130-31, 1 S. Ct. 102, 107 (1882).
16. "The most frequently asserted basis for this conclusion is that . . . [prescrip-
tion] affects solely the nature of the remedy to be afforded and the forum should be
permitted to fashion its own remedy even though it recognizes foreign law to determine
parties' rights." Locke, Use of Foreign Statutes of Limitations in Illinois: An Analysis
of Statutory and Judicial Technique, 34 De Paul L. Rev. 407, 413 n.20 (1985). However,
this classification of laws as substantive and procedural is often difficult because
"substance often gradually shades into procedure." Grossman, supra note 9, at 7. For
instance, liberative prescription is often considered to have "both 'substantive' and
'procedural' aspects." A. Von Mehren & D. Trautman, The Law of Multistate Problems
209 (1965).
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forum.17 According to this common law view, liberative prescription
bars only the remedy; it does not bar the underlying right of action
which is still enforceable in another jurisdiction with an unexpired
limitation period. 8
The substance-procedure dichotomy may of course be defended
on the basis of practical considerations. 9 In a wholly domestic case,
the forum applies its substantive laws-those' that "create rights, du-
ties, and obligations"-as well as its procedural laws-those that "pre-
scribe the manner in which such rights and responsibilities may be
exercised and enforced in a court. ' 20 On the other hand, requiring a
forum in a multistate case to adhere to a foreign state's intricate
procedural rules of form, pleading, and evidence would unduly burden
the forum's judicial process. 21 Yet, while the various states' procedural
rules, such as those concerning pleadings, may be detailed, complex,
and diverse, prescriptive laws of the different states are "no more
difficult for local courts and lawyers to ascertain . . . than the foreign
'substantive' law. ' 22 Furthermore, unlike genuine procedural law, lib-
.17. La. Civ. Code art. 10.; see, e.g., Gierling v. Garner, 284 So. 2d 664, 666
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1973).
18. E.g., Grossman, supra note 9, at 10; R. Leflar, supra note 9, § 127, at 252-
53; Comment, supra note 15, at 1135. Earlier commentators often accepted the right-
remedy distinction as sufficient support for the application of the lex fori rule for
issues of prescription without question or hesitation. See, e.g., J. Beale, Selections
From a Treatise on the Conflict of Laws (1935):
That the statute of limitations of the forum is the applicable law of limitations
is so well-settled in Anglo-American law at least, as to be beyond dispute....
From the doctrine that statutes of limitation 'relate to the remedy' it logically
follows that the fact that the suit would be barred by the foreign statute if
action were brought where the right arose is no defense to the action at the
forum.
Id. at 1620-21.
The historical development of the procedural classification of prescription and the
underlying "right-remedy" distinction has been extensively analyzed elsewhere. See A.
Ehrenzweig, supra note 9, at 428; Ailes, Substance and Procedure in the Conflict of
Laws, 39 Mich. L. Rev. 392, 396-401 (1941); Developments in the Law-Statutes of
Limitation, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 1177 (1950); Note, Delimitation of "Procedure" in the
Conflict of Laws, 47 Harv. L. Rev. 315 (1933). The procedural characterization of
liberative prescription has been termed "an accident of history." Bournias v. Atlantic
Maritime Co., 220 F.2d 152, 154 (2d Cir. 1955).
19. See Grossman, supra note 9, at 6.
20. Black's Law Dictionary 1083, 1281 (5th ed. 1979).
21. Vernon, Statutes of Limitations in the Conflict of Laws: Borrowing Statutes,
32 Rocky Mtn. L. Rev. 287, 288 (1960). See also, Heavner v. Uniroyal, Inc., 63 N.J.
130, 135, 305 A.2d 412, 415 (1973) ("It would be an impossible task for the [forum]
court . . . to conform to procedural methods and diversities of the state whose sub-
stantive law is to be applied. The determination of that law is a difficult enough
burden to impose upon a foreign tribunal.").
22. Vernon, supra note 21, at 289.
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erative prescription can have a substantial impact on the outcome of
a case."
Exceptions to the General Rule
Recognizing the weaknesses of a system of always applying the
forum's laws of prescription and the dangers of forum-shopping in-
herent therein, legislatures and courts have created exceptions to the
general lex fori rule.24 These exceptions generally treat statutes of
limitations as substantive in part and allow a forum to apply a foreign
state's prescriptive laws in certain limited situations.
The Judicial Exception
Acknowledging that not all statutes of limitation are intended
merely to bar the remedy, courts have displaced the lex fori with the
law of the foreign state that created the right of action when the
foreign limitation bars the right of action itself. 5 In Louisiana, statutes
which bar a right of action are characterized as statutes of peremp-
tion.26 The Louisiana Supreme Court has distinguished peremption
from liberative prescription, stating:
When a statute creates a right of action and stipulates the
delay within which that right is to be executed, the delay thus
fixed is not, properly speaking, one of prescription, but it is
one of peremption. Statutes of prescription simply bar the
remedy. Statutes of peremption destroy the cause of action
itself. That is to say, after the limit of time expires the cause
of action no longer exists; it is lost.
2 7
23. Grossman, supra note 9, at 16. By clearing court dockets of old claims,
prescription can be considered procedural. However, substantive aspects of prescription
are reflected when the rights of parties are affected by prescription. Comment, supra
note 15, at 1139.
24. See Restatement (Second) § 143 comment a.
25. Restatement (Second) § 143 ("An action will not be entertained in another
state if it is barred in the state of the otherwise applicable law by a statute of limitations
which bars the right and not merely the remedy."); Restatement § 605 ("If by the
law of the state which has created a right of action, it is made a condition of the
right that it shall expire after a certain period of limitation has elapsed, no action
begun after the period has elapsed can be maintained in any state.").
26. La. Civ. Code art. 3458 ("Peremption is a period of time fixed by law for
the existence of a right. Unless timely exercised, the right is extinguished upon the
expiration of the peremptive period.").
27. Guillory v. Avoyelles Ry. Co., 104 La. 11, 15, 28 So. 899, 901 (1900). See
also Succession of Pizzillo, 223 La. 328, 65 So. 2d 783 (1953); Equilease Corp. v.
M/V Sampson, 756 F.2d 357 (5th Cir. 1985). See generally Comment, Prescription
and Peremption-The 1982 Revision of the Louisiana Civil Code, 58 Tul L. Rev. 593
(1983).
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In common law jurisdictions, only statutorily created rights have been
considered appropriate for this exception. 21 In theory, this judicial
exception could be utilized regardless of the length of the forum's
prescriptive period. In practice, however, resort to foreign law gen-
erally occurs only when its limitation period is shorter than that of
the forum. 29 To apply this exception, various tests have been for-
mulated to determine if a statute of limitations affects the right of
action instead of merely the remedy.30
First, the "built-in test" treats the statute of limitation as sub-
stantive if the same statute that creates the right of action also provides
a limitation period for the filing of a lawsuit.' This test was first
articulated by the United States Supreme Court in the wrongful death
case of The Harrisburg:
The time within which suit must be brought operates as a
limitation of the liability itself as created, and not of the
remedy alone. It is a condition attached to the right to sue
at all. . . . Time has been made of the essence of the right,
and the right is lost if the time is disregarded. The liability
and the remedy are created by the same statutes, and the
limitations of the remedy are therefore to be treated as lim-
itations of the right.3 2
Second, the "specificity test" extends the "built-in test" by re-
quiring an analysis of the time limitation, whether or not located in
the same statute that created the right. According to this test:
[T]he fact that the limitation is contained in the same section
or the same statute is material only as bearing on construction.
It is merely a ground for saying that the limitation goes to
the right created, and accompanies the obligation everywhere.
The same conclusion would be reached if the limitation was
in a different statute, provided it was directed to the newly
created liability so specifically as to warrant saying that it
qualified the right."
28. See, e.g., Kozan v. Comstock, 270 F.2d 839, 841 (5th Cir. 1959); R. Leflar,
supra note 9, § 127, at 254.
29. R. Leflar, supra note 9, § 127, at 254.
30. For an excellent discussion of these tests, see Grossman, supra note 9, at 11;
see also, Bournias v. Atlantic Maritime Co., 220 F.2d 152, 155 (2d Cir. 1955).
31. E.g., Price v. Litton Sys., Inc., 607 F. Supp. 30, 32 (S.D. Miss.' 1984),
modified, 784 F.2d 600 (5th Cir. 1986).
32. 119 U.S. 199, 214, 7 S. Ct. 140, 147 (1886), overruled on other grounds,
Moragne v. State Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 90 S. Ct. 1772 (1970) (emphasis
added).
33. Davis v. Mills, 194 U.S. 451, 454, 24 S. Ct. 692, 694 (1904).
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Although other less utilized tests have been adopted by some courts,3 4
the "specificity test" is considered the most popular in the United
States. 11
The limited applicability and the vagueness of these tests has
generated criticism questioning the effectiveness of the judicial excep-
tion.3 6 Be that as it may, this exception reflects a genuine attempt by
the courts to ameliorate the harshness often produced by the me-
chanical use of the forum's prescriptive laws. The exception offers
further protection from stale lawsuits and reduces forum-shopping,
albeit in limited circumstances. The Louisiana Third Circuit Court of
Appeal recognized this judicial exception and the "specificity test" in
the maritime personal injury case of Istre v. Diamond M. Drilling
Co.3" Nevertheless, the court did not apply the test, because "[t]here
[was] no . . . statute [in the case] which limit[ed] the time within
which such a right exist[ed], or which extinguish[ed] the right in any
way." 3 Both state and federal courts in Louisiana have discussed this
exception in other recent cases, but none contained the fact pattern
necessary for choosing a foreign state's limitation period. 9
Borrowing Statutes
State legislatures have provided another exception to the lex fori
rule by enacting "borrowing statutes," aptly so named because "[tihey
'borrow' the limitation rule of [some] other state and make it the
forum state's law for purposes of the particular litigation. ' 40 These
statutes direct a court faced with a choice-of-law prescription problem
to apply the foreign state's limitation laws if those laws prescribe a
34. The "attributes test" requires an analysis of the foreign statute's characteristics
to determine if it should be regarded as substantive (e.g., whether the defense is
available without pleading the statute). The "foreign court test" looks to the other
court's treatment of its own statute. Grossman, supra note 9, at 12-13.
35. Restatement (Second) § 143 comment c.
36. A. Ehrenzweig, supra note 9, at 432 ("[The tests are] highly arbitrary ...
unreliable . .. [and] circular."); Tomlin v. Boeing Co., 650 F.2d 1065, 1070 (9th Cir.
1981) (" 'The struggles of the courts to determine whether the locus has destroyed
the right are amusing, even if the results are inconsistent and the reasoning at times
most specious.' "), quoting Sedler, The Erie Outcome Test as a Guide to Substance
and Procedure in the Conflict of Laws, 37 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 813, 848 (1962).
37. 226 So. 2d 779, 796 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969) (on rehearing).
38. Id. Louisiana courts have not recently mentioned any tests other than the
"specificity test."
39. Kleckley v. Hebert, 464 So. 2d 39, 45 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1985); Rohde v.
Southeastern Drilling Co., 667 F.2d 1215, 1219 (5th Cir. 1982); Kozan v. Comstock,
270 F.2d 839, 841 (5th Cir. 1959).
40. R. Leflar, supra note 9, § 128, at 256.
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period that bars the claim. 4' If the forum's statute already bars the
claim, the borrowing statute is not applicable.
Louisiana's borrowing statute, originally enacted in 1855,42 in its
current form provides:
When a contract or obligation has been entered into between
persons who reside out of this state, which is to be paid or
performed out of this state, and such contract or obligation
is barred by prescription, or the statute of limitations, of the
place where it is to be paid or performed, it shall be considered
and held to be barred by prescription in this state, upon the
debtor who is thus discharged. coming into this state. 43
This statute provides three requirements which must be met before a
foreign limitation period can be borrowed. First, the claim must be
based on a contract 44 between nonresidents.45 Second, such contract
must call for performance or payment outside of Louisiana.4 6 Finally,
41. Restatement (Second) § 142 comment f.
42. 1855 La. Acts No. 168.
43. La. Civ. Code art. 10.
44. Obligations arise from tortious acts as well as contracts. La. Civ. Code art.
1757. Therefore, the borrowing statute could ostensibly apply to lawsuits based in
contract or tort. However, the borrowing statute refers to obligations which are to be
"paid or performed." Clearly, conventional obligations require either payment or
performance. Delictual obligations, on the other hand, are not really performed. Rather,
payment is made in satisfaction of a judgment based on the tort, not in satisfaction
of the delictual obligation itself. Since article 3501 of the Louisiana Civil Code supplies
the choice-of-law rules for the prescription of such judgments, article 10's borrowing
statute is probably not applicable to tort actions. Excluding delictual obligations from
the scope of the borrowing statute does not render the reference to other obligations
superfluous. The term "obligation" can be interpreted as referring to obligations arising
from juridical acts other than contracts and to quasi-contractual obligations. Other
writers have stated, without discussion, that the Louisiana borrowing statute only
applies to contractual obligations. See Comment, Revision of the Civil Code Provisions
on Liberative Prescription, 60 Tul. L. Rev. 379, 393 (1985); Comment, Limitation of
Actions in the Conflict of Laws, 10 La. L. Rev. 374, 388 (1950).
45. There is some authority for the proposition that the pertinent residence of the
parties is not their domicile at the time of suit, but rather at the time of contract.
Young & Geraghty v. Bowie, 3 La. App. 8 (Orl. 1925), involved a suit by two Maryland
doctors for payment of a debt for medical services performed in 1917 on Mr. Bowie,
a Texas resident. Two years after Mr. Bowie's death in 1918, Mrs. Bowie moved to
Louisiana. When suit was filed in 1921, Mrs. Bowie pleaded the two-year Texas statute
of limitations. Since the claim had prescribed under Texas law before Mrs. Bowie
moved from Texas, the court applied the Louisiana borrowing statute and held the
claim barred by the "borrowed" Texas law. If the residence of the parties had been
determined as of the time of the lawsuit, the borrowing statute would have been
inapplicable because the defendant was a resident of Louisiana at that time.
46. See Young & Geraghty v. Bowie, 3 La. App. 8 (Orl. 1925), discussed in supra
note 45.
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the claim must be barred by the prescriptive laws of the foreign state
before the debtor comes to Louisiana. 47 When these prerequisites are
fulfilled, the plaintiff is denied the benefit of the longer Louisiana
limitation period, and the defendant is not subject to a claim that
was created and subsequently barred by another state.
Like Louisiana, three-fourths of the states have enacted borrowing
statutes designed to yield uniform results regardless of the forum. 41
Nevertheless, for various reasons, borrowing legislation cannot always
achieve such results. First, some states have not enacted a borrowing
statute. Second, since a foreign limitation law is borrowed only when
it is shorter than that of the forum, a forum's shorter prescriptive
period can bar a claim not yet barred in the foreign state. 49 Third,
since the statutory terminology and judicial interpretations of the
various states' borrowing statutes are inconsistent, uniform results are
not always possible. 0 Also, most borrowing statutes require a deter-
mination of the place where the cause of action accrued or arose.,'
Such a determination is often difficult to make since the activity giving
rise to a cause of action may not be centered in one state. For example,
defamatory statements are often published or communicated regionally
or nationally, and a simple contract, signed in one state, , may require
performance in a second state and payment in a third.
Another reason behind the enactment of borrowing statutes was
to protect defendants from the perpetual liability often created by a
forum's tolling provisions which suspend the running of prescription
in certain instances. 52 These tolling statutes, which vary from state to
47. As explained by the Louisiana Supreme Court, this requirement is satisfied
only when "the defendant removes to the State of Louisiana after he has become
entitled to the benefit of the plea of the statute of limitations of the place where the
judgment was rendered." Walworth v. Routh, 14 La. Ann. 205, 206 (1859). Although
the borrowing statute no longer applies to the prescription of judgments as it did at
the time of Walworth, the above interpretation should also apply to the prescription
of contractual claims. See Young and Geraghty v. Bowie, 3 La. App. 8 (Orl. 1925),
discussed supra in note 45.
, 48. See generally Ester, Borrowing Statutes of Limitation and Conflict of Laws,
15 U. Fla. L. Rev. 33 (1962); Vernon, supra note 21, at 289.
49. See, e.g., Grossman, supra note 9, at 15.
50. Id. Professor Vernon has classified borrowing statutes into seventeen'distinct
categories based on their similarities. See Vernon, supra note 21, at 294-96.
51. See e.g., Grossman, supra note 9, at 15; cf. R. Leflar, supra note 9, § 128,
at 256. Louisiana's borrowing statute does not refer to the state where the action
accrued or arose, but to the "place where [the contract] is to be paid or performed."
La. Civ. Code art. 10.
52. E.g., Milhollin, supra note 9, at 29.
Tolling provisions were originally enacted to prevent a potential defendant from
avoiding liability by merely fleeing from the state until the local prescriptive period
had run. R. Leflar, supra note 9, § 128, at 257-58. Today, with the current, status of
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state, typically suspend the limitation period when an obligor is "ab-
sent from" or "not a resident of" the state. 3 As a result, the non-
resident could find himself amenable to suit in a forum with personal
jurisdiction even though the cause of action had expired fifteen or
twenty years earlier in the state in which it arose. Although Louisiana
does not have a general tolling provision similar to many other states,
5 4
Louisiana courts encounter tolling issues when a party pleads another
state's tolling statute or a special Louisiana tolling statute.
Once the borrowing statute is determined to be applicable, most
states borrow the foreign statute of limitations "with all of its ac-
couterments . . . whether . . . [legislative] or . . judicial." 5 5 The
accouterments encompass related legislative and jurisprudential rules
which interpret and restrict the borrowed statute of limitations, in-
cluding any tolling provisions. This extended adoption of the foreign
law prevents the "splitting of foreign rules whose elements may be
interdependent." 5 6
Critique of the Traditional Approach
An unqualified application of the lex fori fails to consider the
multistate nature of conflicts cases, and may frustrate the policies
underlying statutes of limitations, as well as undermine the goal of
uniformity of results. Limitation periods represent legislative deter-
minations of the reasonable time for the allowance of a lawsuit.5 7
These determinations are designed, first to "protect defendants and
the courts from having to deal with cases in which the search for the
in personam jurisdiction as expanded by International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326
U.S. 310, 66 S. Ct. 154 (1945) and its progeny, and the various state long-arm statutes,
the need for such tolling statutes is no longer present. For an argument that these
statutes should not be applied to persons continually subject to service of process, see
R. Leflar, supra note 9, § 128, at 258. Yet, many courts still apply the tolling provisions
to suspend prescription even though the defendant remains available for service under
a long-arm statute. Id. See also Hopkins v. Kelsey-Hayes, Inc., 628 F.2d 801, 811
(3d Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded, 455 U.S. 404, 102 S. Ct. 1137 (1982).
53. E.g., R. Leflar, supra note 9, § 128, at 257-58.
54. The general rule in Louisiana is found in the "anti-tolling" provision of La.
Civ. Code art. 3468 ("Prescription runs against absentees and incompetents, including
minors and interdicts, unless exception is established by legislation."). One exception
is provided by La. R. S. 9:5802 (1983), which states: "Prescription does not run
against the action of a citizen of this state against a former citizen or resident of this
state who is a fugitive from justice and without a representative in this state upon
whom judicial process may be served." This exception is so limited that it was only
mentioned in a footnote in Vernon, The Uniform Statute of Limitations on Foreign
Claims Act: Tolling Problems, 12 Vand. L. Rev. 971, 977 n.23 (1959).
55. Ester, supra note 48, at 57.
56. A. Ehrenzweig, supra note 9, at 431.
57. Milhollin, supra note 9, at 10.
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truth may be seriously impaired by the loss of evidence, whether by
death or disappearance of witnesses, fading memories, disappearance
of documents, or otherwise." 58 Thus, statutes of limitation protect
defendants from stale lawsuits that, if not barred, could place a
defendant at a disadvantage by forcing him to defend himself without
sufficient evidence, especially if he did not anticipate the lawsuit. 9
Secondly, limitation periods are designed to protect the judicial system.
The barring of state claims promotes judicial economy by allowing a
court efficiently to allocate its time to more deserving cases. 60 Judicial
integrity is also preserved by reducing the chance of an erroneous or
inequitable judgment in cases where relevant evidence is lost or dis-
torted due to delay. 61
When prescription has accrued under the law of the state where
the cause of action arose but not under the law of the forum, the
automatic application of the law of the forum may or may not be
consistent with the above policies. 62 The foreign state that created the
right of action has determined that the shorter time period is sufficient
for potential plaintiffs who seek to enforce their rights. After the
expiration of this limitation period, the foreign state's policy of repose
for defendants becomes important, at least when the defendant was
domiciled there or acted in reasonable reliance on that law. 63 In such
circumstances to ignore the foreign limitation period and to apply the
forum's unexpired period may frustrate the policies of the foreign
state without necessarily advancing the policies of the forum. The
granting of relief on such a claim will frustrate the foreign state's
policy of repose. Unless the plaintiff is a resident of the forum or
the parties reasonably relied on the forum's law, application of forum
prescription law would not promote any discernible interest of that
state. Nor would the forum's own policies favoring judicial economy
and efficiency be frustrated by the application of the foreign law.
Furthermore, from the perspective of the interstate community, ap-
plication of the forum's unexpired limitation period 64 in such a case
58. Ehrenhaft v. Malcolm Price, Inc., 483 A.2d 1192, 1202 (D.C. 1984) (quoting
United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117, 100 S. Ct. 352, 357 (1979)). See also
Restatement (Second) § 142 comment d.
59. Cf. Leflar, The New Conflicts-Limitations Act, 35 Mercer L. Rev. 461, 471
(1984); Milhollin, supra note 9, at 10.
60. Leflar, supra note 59, at 471-72.
61. Id.
62. E.g., Grossman, supra note 9, at 17. In such a case, in the absence of a
borrowing statute the forum applies its longer, unexpired limitation period to hear the
suit because the right of action is viewed as persisting, albeit without a remedy, in
the foreign state. See supra text accompanying notes 16-18.
63. Milhollin, supra note 9, at 11.
64. E.g., Steele v. G.D. Searle & Co., 428 F. Supp. 646 (S.D. Miss. 1977); R.
Leflar, supra note 9, § 127, at 253.
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would promote "forum shopping" for a more favorable result. This
is contrary to the general conflict of laws objective of maintaining
uniform results regardless of the forum 65 and is also inequitable since
the plaintiff is allowed to rely on the law of a foreign state for his
cause of action, but the defendant is denied a defense available under
the same law. 66 Additionally, a defendant may be required to preserve
his evidence for an indeterminable time to guard against the possibility
of a timely filed lawsuit in any state with jurisdiction over him. 67 As
a result and without any justification in policy, the forum's dockets
get more crowded, the claims considered stale at the place of accrual
are tried and the defendant is subjected to a lawsuit that he may
justifiably have expected was barred. 68
There may be more justification for the lex fori rule when the
forum applies its own shorter prescriptive period to bar a claim that
is still valid in the foreign state that granted the cause of action.6 9
First, the forum's policies of preserving judicial integrity and pro-
tecting judicial economy are furthered by the application of its own
limitation period. Second, the forum's plaintiff-favoring policies are
65. Vernon, supra note 21, at 293.
66. Grossman, supra note 9, at 18.
67. A. Ehrenzweig, supra note 9, at 429. In the converse case when the forum
applies its shorter limitation to bar an action based on a fdreign state's law, the
defendant benefits from the use of the forum state's law.
68. This situation is only partially offset by the substantive treatment of liberative
prescription granted by the judicial exception and the borrowing statutes discussed
earlier, supra text accompanying notes 24-56. This substantive treatment allows repose
for defendants, prevents forum shopping, and reduces the possibility of perpetual
liability. However, as already explained, narrowly defined requirements must be met
before these exceptions can be invoked. Additionally; borrowing statutes, if enacted
and applicable, sometimes call for the application of the law of a state that is no
longer relevant under modern conflict of laws theory. Grossman, supra note 9, at 15;
E. Scoles & P. Hay, Conflict of Laws 64 (1982). Therefore, the limited applicability
and the traditional basis of these exceptions prevent them from overcoming the de-
ficiencies in the general lex fori rule.
69. Grossman, supra note 9, at 21. To illustrate, assume that a plaintiff has a
cause of action governed substantively by State X. After two years, plaintiff sues
defendant in State Y (the forum). State X has a three-year limitation period and State
Y has a one-year period. By applying its shorter limitation period, the forum advances
its policy of protecting the judicial system. First, judicial efficiency is promoted by
reducing the case load. Second, the quality of justice is not jeopardized by a decision
possibly based on incomplete evidence. Also, by barring the action, the court furthers
its policy of repose for defendants. See R. Leflar, supra note 9, § 127, at 253. This
policy of repose for defendants is relevant mostly when the defendant is a resident
of the state which enacted the statute of limitations, since a state's laws are presumed
to be for the benefit of its own citizens. See Currie, Married'Women's Contracts: A
Study in Conflict-of-Laws Method, 25 U. Chi. L. Rev. 227, 230-31 (1958); Note, 15'
Land & Water L. Rev. 717, 728 (1980) ("The basic premise of interest analysis is that
every legislature enacts laws for the benefit of its own citizens.").
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not implicated, since its limitation period has expired. Also, the forum
has an interest in exculpating the defendant from liability if he is a
resident of the forum.70 It should be noted, however, that the foreign
state that created the cause of action has determined that a longer
time period should be allowed for a plaintiff to seek judicial relief.
Hence, the foreign state's policy of providing a judicial remedy will
be frustrated, especially if the plaintiff is a resident of that foreign
state. In fact, the plaintiff may have had a legitimate expectation of
suing in that foreign state with its unexpired limitation period. Yet,
due to jurisdictional requirements the defendant may no longer be
amenable to suit in that foreign state. As a result, the plaintiff may
be denied his only chance to litigate if it is not jurisdictionally possible
or economically feasible to sue elsewhere. 71
In summary, therefore, although application of the law of the
forum to issues of prescription is undeniably an easy rule for the
courts to follow, it has all of the drawbacks which modern theory
has revealed in mechanical rules. The lex fori rule does not allow a
c6nsideration of the particular facts and circumstances of each case,
and, as a result, often undermines the interests and policies of the
interested states.
MODERN CHOICE-OF-LAW THEORY
Generally
In the last three decades, most states have abandoned the territorial
approach of the traditional theory in favor of more flexible choice-
of-law methodologies, such as "governmental interest analysis ' 72 and
70. Milhollin, supra note 9, at 10-11.
71. R. Weintraub, Commentary on the Conflict of Laws 60 (3d ed. 1986).
72. According to its intellectual father, Professor Brainerd Currie, interest analysis
generally makes conflict of law decisions by analyzing the interest of each concerned
state in the application of its own law. To ascertain these interests, the potentially
applicable laws of each state are examined and interpreted in order to uncover their
underlying purposes and policies. Then, based on the particular facts and circumstances
of the case, a determination is made as to whether the application of a state's law
will advance that state's policies. If so, that state has an interest in the particular
issue. If only one state has an interest in the application of its own law, a false
conflict exists and the law of the interested state is applied. If, on the other hand,
each state has an interest in the case, a true conflict exists, and the law of the forum
generally controls. Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws,
1959 Duke L.J. 171, 178, reprinted in B. Currie, Selected Essays on the Conflict of
Laws 177, 183-84 (1963).
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the "significant relationship" approach of the Restatement (Second). 73
These methodologies replace the mechanical rules of the traditional
theory 4 with an issue-by-issue analysis of the relevant policies and
interests of each potentially concerned state. Thus far, however, these
modern approaches have not been extended to issues of prescription.
Despite persistent criticism by commentators, 5 the majority of states
still adhere to the lex fori rule for issues of prescription. 76 Recognizing
the importance of liberative prescription to the outcome of a case,
these scholars advocate alternative approaches which basically treat
liberative prescription as an issue of substantive law. After all, as one
commentator noted, "[tihere is no inherent reason why the choice
between statutes of limitations should be handled any differently than
other choice-of-law problems. ' 77 Heeding this advice, a few states
have rejected the lex fori rule in favor of methods more consistent
with the choice-of-law methodologies that they employ for other issues.
The Controlling Jurisdiction Method
One modern approach, whiich, for lack of a better name, will be
referred to as "the controlling jurisdiction method," recognizes the
close relationship between a state's substantive laws and its prescriptive
statutes. Under this method, prescription is governed by the law of
the "controlling" state rather than the forum qua forum-that is, the
73. The Restatement (Second) utilizes a flexible weighing process to choose the
law of the state that has the most significant relationship with the case. The deter-
mination of the state having the most significant relationship is based on certain general
factors listed in § 6:
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems, (b) the relevant
policies of the forum, (c) the relevant policies of other interested states and
the relative interests of those states in the determination of the particular
issue, (d) the protection of justified expectations, (e) the basic policies un-
derlying the particular field of law, (f) certainty, predictability, and uniformity
of result, and (g) ease in the determination and application of the law to
be applied.
These factors are judged in light of various contacts with the states. The contacts
relevant for each specific type of legal issue are laid out in various sections of the
Restatement (Second). See, e.g., § 145 (torts) (reproduced in infra note 128), § 188
(contracts).
74. See supra note 12 for a brief explanation of the traditional theory.
75. See authorities cited supra note 9.
76. Grossman, supra note 9, at 33; see, e.g., Cuthbertson v. Uhley, 509 F.2d 225
(8th Cir. 1975); Harris v. Clinton Corn Processing Co., 360 N.W.2d 812 (Iowa, 1985);
Ouellette v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 466 A.2d 478 (Me. 1983). See infra text accompanying
notes 122-33 for a discussion of Louisiana's refusal to abandon the lex fori rule on
issues of prescription.
77. R. Leflar, supra note 9, § 127, at 256.
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state whose substantive law governs the other issues of the case.78 To
determine the controlling state, a forum follows its own choice-of-
law methodology to determine which state's law should govern the
substantive issues of the case.
This method appears to have been implemented in Heavner v.
Uniroyal, Inc. , 79 a case in which the Supreme Court of New Jersey
abandoned the traditional lex fori rule and applied the controlling
state's statute of limitations. Heavner was a product liability case
brought by a North Carolina plaintiff for injuries suffered in an
accident in North Carolina. The accident resulted from the blowout
of a Uniroyal tire mounted on a trailer purchased in North Carolina
from Pullman, Inc. Both defendants, Uniroyal and Pullman, were
engaged in business in North Carolina and were subject to nationwide
service of process.8 0 The lawsuit was filed more than three years after
the accident, but less than four years after the purchase. North Car-
olina's three-year statute of limitations had expired, but New Jersey's
four-year limitation period had not.8 ' The court examined the facts
of the case and, utilizing a modern governmental interest analysis,
determined that North Carolina law would govern the substantive
issues.8 2 Since North Carolina was the controlling state on the sub-
stantive issues, that state's statute of limitations was "borrowed" and
the suit was barred. 83
The court did not elaborate on the reasons for its determination
that New Jersey had no interest in applying its own law. It merely
noted that Uniroyal's incorporation in New Jersey, the only potential
interest of New Jersey, was insufficient to justify application of New
Jersey's substantive law under governmental interest analysis.8 4 The
Third Circuit Court of Appeals later tried to explain Heavner by
reasoning that:
[T]he policies evident in New Jersey's liberal law would not
have been fostered in the case. The primary purpose of a torts
78. Note, An Interest-Analysis Approach to the Selection of Statutes of Limitation,
49 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 299 (1974); see also Note, supra note 15, at 492.
79. 63 N.J. 130, 305 A.2d 412 (1973). That the court in Heavner utilized the
'.controlling jurisdiction" method was the conclusion of the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals in Schum v. Bailey, 578 F.2d 493 (3d Cir. 1978). As the court in Schum
explained, "We glean from Heavner that the critical determination underlying the
'borrowing' of a foreign statute of limitations is a determination as to whether a
foreign substantive law is to be applied." 578 F.2d at 495.
80. Heavner, 63 N.J. at 133, 305 A.2d at 414.
81. Id. at 134, 305 A.2d at 414.
82. Id. at 134-35 n.3, 305 A.2d at 414 n.3.
83. Id. at 141, 305 A.2d at 418.
84. Id. at 134-35 n.3, 305 A.2d at 414 n.3.
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recovery is to compensate plaintiffs for their injury. Since the
Heavners were domiciliaries of North Carolina, New Jersey
had no interest in protecting their compensation rights. An
alternate purpose . . . [is] to deter future misconduct. Where
the tortious activity took place wholly outside of New Jersey
as in Heavner, however, that policy could not be fostered . 5
The Uniform Act
This "controlling jurisdiction method" is the basis for the Uniform
Conflict of Laws-Limitations Act (the "Uniform Act") which was
approved in 1982 by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws.16 The Uniform Act abrogates the lex fori rule
and, if adopted, would provide legislative authority for applying the
liberative prescription rules of the controlling state.17
Section 2 of the Uniform Act establishes the general rule that
applicable limitation periods are to be determined by the law of the
state that governs the substantive issues. That section states:
(a) Except as provided by Section 4, if a claim is substantively
based:
(1) upon the law of one other state, the limitation period
of that state applies; or
(2) upon the law of more than one state, the limitation
period of one of those states chosen by the law of conflict
of laws of this State applies.
(b) The limitation period of this State applies to all other
claims.88
Unlike the limited judicial exception and the borrowing statutes de-
veloped under the traditional theory, this section operates whether the
85. Henry v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 508 F.2d 28, 33 (3d Cir. 1975) (footnote
omitted). For other cases which have applied the statute of limitations of the controlling
jurisdiction, see, e.g., Schum v. Bailey, 578 F.2d 493 (3d Cir. 1978); Pine v. Eli Lilly
& Co., 201 N.J. Super. 186, 492 A.2d 1079 (1985). As the Schum case exemplifies,
the forum's statute of limitations can be applied if the forum is determined to be the
controlling state.
86. 12 U.L.A. 51 (1985).
87. Unif. Conflict of Laws-Limitations Act § 2 comment, 12 U.L.A. 52 (1985).
Four states have adopted the Uniform Act since its promulgation in 1982: Arkansas
in 1985 (Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 37-301 to 37-307) (Supp. 1985); Colorado in 1984 (Colo.
Rev. Stat. §§ 13-82-101 to 13-82-107) (Supp. 1985); North Dakota in 1985 (N.D. Cent.
Code §§ 28-01.2-01 to 28-01.2-05) (Supp. 1985); and Washington in 1983 (Wash. Rev.
Code Ann. §§ 4.18.010 to 4.18.904) (Supp. 1985).
88. Unif. Conflict of Laws-Limitations Act § 2, 12 U.L.A. 52 (1985).
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forum's limitation period is longer or shorter than that of the foreign
state.89
Section 3 provides that the applicable law includes the foreign
state's accrual and tolling provisions. 90 The judicial exceptions and
the borrowing statutes discussed earlier operated similarly, but only
in the limited situations that fulfilled their requirements. 91
Section 4 introduces an escape provision to prevent possible un-
fairness that could result from application of the general rules con-
tained in Sections 2 and 3. Section 4 provides:
If a court determines that the limitation period of another
state applicable under Sections 2 and 3 is substantially different
from the limitation period of this State and has not afforded
a fair opportunity to sue upon, or imposes an unfair burden
in defending against, the claim, the limitation period of this
State applies. 92
This section allows a court to enforce its state's public policy in
certain instances. Nevertheless, the escape clause is intended to be
used sparingly. As explained in the official comments to Section 4,
"[i]t is not enough that the forum state's limitation period is different
from that of the state whose substantive law is governing; the dif-
ference must be 'substantial.' 93 For example, a foreign tolling statute
may have indefinitely suspended the running of prescription against
a nonresident defendant who was always amenable to service of process
under a long-arm statute. 94 Applying this tolling statute could subject
the defendant to suit ten or twenty years after the cause of action
arose, a result which may be considered unfair under the policies of
the forum state. By resorting to Section 4, the forum could apply its
own limitation period to avoid that unfairness.
Section 4 also protects a plaintiff from unfair accrual provisions
found in some states. For example, the discovery rule is the majority
rule in the United States for the commencement of prescription in a
medical malpractice case. 95 Under this rule, prescription does not begin
to run until the alleged tort is or should be discovered. 96 If the
limitation period of a state without this discovery rule is chosen, the
89. Id. § 2 comment, 12 U.L.A. at 52.
90. Id. § 3, 12 U.L.A. at 52.
91. See generally supra text accompanying notes 24-56. In contrast to Section 3,
the borrowing statute and judicial exceptions operated only when the foreign law barred
the action, and then only when their respective conditions were satisfied.
92. Unif. Conflict of Laws-Limitations Act § 4, 12 U.L.A. 53 (1985).
93. Id. § 4 comment, 12 U.L.A. at 53.
94. Leflar, supra note 58, at 474.
95. Id. at 470 n.52.
96. See, e.g., La. R.S. 9:5628 (1983).
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plaintiff unfairly may be denied a reasonable time to sue. Section 4
provides an equitable solution to this problem.
This "controlling jurisdiction method" has at least three advan-
tages as compared to the lex fori rule. 97 First, it effectively deters
forum shopping. Second, it avoids the selection of a disinterested
state's limitation law by encouraging a rational and individualized
analysis of the involved policies and interests. Finally, it avoids the
inconsistency of allowing the plaintiff to base his claim on the law
of a state, while denying the defendant the benefit of a defense under
the same state's law.
Nonetheless, the "controlling jurisdiction method" may on oc-
casion yield incongruous results, as when a plaintiff's cause of action
is barred by the shorter limitation period of a state whose law would
be applicable to the merits but which may have no interest in applying
its prescriptive law, thereby protecting, for instance, a nonresident
defendant. 9 Foreseeing this deficiency, the Heavner court rendered a
narrow holding limited to the facts of the case. 99 As the court rec-
ognized, "there may well be situations involving significant interests
of this state where it would be inequitable or unjust to apply the
[controlling state's statute of limitations]."' °00 Following this lead by
the court in Heavner, the drafters of the Uniform Act provided the
"escape" provision in Section 4 which authorizes a court to disregard
the controlling state's prescriptive period in limited circumstances.' 0'
The shortcoming of the "controlling jurisdiction method" that this
exception addresses results from a failure to consider the specific
policies and interests underlying liberative prescription. Without this
additional analysis the controlling jurisdiction method may produce
results which are as mechanical as those under the lex fori approach.
The Separate Issue Method
The above problems may be avoided by an approach recently
followed by some courts which view liberative prescription as a distinct
97. The advantages of the controlling jurisdiction test are more fully discussed in
Grossman, supra note 9, at 40-42.
98. Note, supra note 78, at 322.
99. We need go no further now than to say that when the cause of action
arises in another state, the parties are all present in and amenable to the
jurisdiction of that state, New Jersey has no substantial interest in the matter,
the substantive law of the foreign state is to be applied, and its limitation
period has expired at the time suit is commenced here, New Jersey will hold
the suit barred.
Heavner, 63 N.J. at 141, 305 A.2d at 418.
100. Id., 305 A.2d at 418.
101. See supra text accompanying note 92.
1170 [Vol. 47
CONFLICTS SYMPOSIUM
choice-of-law issue to be separately analyzed in accordance with the
forum's particular conflicts methodology.10 2 To best effectuate the
interests of each concerned state, these courts first ascertain the pur-
poses of and policies behind each state's statute of limitations and
then examine the specific facts of the case to determine which state's
law will best promote these policies and purposes.
This "separate issue" method was utilized by the Wisconsin Su-
preme Court in Air Products & Chemicals, Inc. v. Fairbanks Morse,
Inc. 03 Air Products involved a breach of contract suit brought in
Wisconsin by a Pennsylvania plaintiff who had purchased some electric
motors from the defendant, a Wisconsin manufacturer. Although the
parties conceded that all other issues were governed by Pennsylvania
law, they disagreed on the applicable statute of limitations. Wisconsin's
relevant limitation period was six years while Pennsylvania provided
the four year prescriptive period of the Uniform Commercial Code.10 4
The court affirmed the trial court's choice of the forum's limitation
period, but disagreed with the lower court determination that Wis-
consin's modern theory was too unpredictable for issues of prescrip-
tion. 1°1 Using its modern approach, the supreme court determined that
the statutes of limitations of both states were designed to protect
defendants and courts from stale claims. Since neither a Pennsylvania
defendant nor a Pennsylvania court was involved, Pennsylvania had
no interest in applying its shorter limitation period.1°6 By providing
a limitation period longer than the four year period of the Uniform
Commercial Code, the court reasoned, Wisconsin's lawmakers decided
that their state would be better served by a longer limitation period.' 7
The "separate issue" method may of course result in the appli-
cation of the prescriptive law of the same state as the one chosen
through the "controlling jurisdiction" method. Such a result need not
invariably occur, however. While the "controlling jurisdiction" method
always applies the prescriptive laws of the state whose law governs
the substantive issues, the "separate issue" method allows the court
the freedom of choosing the limitation law of either that state or of
the forum, based on a rational examination of the policies underlying
the particular limitation laws involved in the case. 08 Such a forthright
102. See, e.g., Tomlin v. Boeing Co., 650 F.2d 1065 (9th Cir. 1981); Ashland
Chem. Co. v. Provence, 129 Cal. App. 3d 790, 181 Cal. Rptr. 340 (1982); Johnson
v. Pischke, 108 Idaho 397, 700 P.2d 19 (1985); Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Fairbanks
Morse, Inc., 58 Wis. 2d 193, 206 N.W.2d 414 (1973).
103. 58 Wis. 2d 193, 206 N.W.2d 414 (1973).
104. Id. at 197, 206 N.W.2d at 418.
105. Id., 206 N.W.2d at 418.
106. Id. at 198, 206 N.W.2d at 419.
107. Id., 206 N.W.2d at 419.
108. Grossman, supra note 9, at 40.
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decision is not possible under either the "controlling jurisdiction"
method or the traditional lex fori rule. Under the "controlling juris-
diction" method, the governing limitation statute is generally borrowed
from the controlling state without considering the special purposes
and policies behind statutes of limitations.109 Hence, the Uniform Act's
general rule had to be qualified by an escape clause to accommodate
those cases in which a court finds it necessary to adhere to its own
prescriptive rules, despite applying a foreign state's substantive law.
Similarly, the Heavner court's holding was specifically limited to the
facts before it in order to allow for the possibility of choosing the
limitation laws of a state other than the controlling jurisdiction in
later cases. Thus, with the "separate issue" method courts can make
a more responsive choice-of-law decision based on an analysis of the
various state policies and interests associated with liberative prescrip-
tion.110 Such an analysis is absent from decisions based on the "con-
trolling jurisdiction" method or the lex fori rule.
Restatement (Second)-A Proposed Revision
A recently proposed revision of the Restatement (Second)'s ap-
proach to liberative prescription would generally supplant the lex fori
rule with a "significant relationship" analysis. 1' Under this proposal,
"[w]hether an action will be maintained against the defense that it
was not timely filed will be determined by the law of the state which,
with respect to that issue, is the state of most significant relationship
to the occurrence and the parties .... 112 However, this general
formula is implemented by more specific rules, one of which deals
with the situation where the forum has a shorter limitation and another
which deals with the situation where the forum has a longer limitation.
When the forum's limitation period has expired, the action generally
will be barred "unless compelling considerations of remedial justice
warrant permitting the action to be maintained in the forum and the
action would not be barred by the statute of limitations of the state
[with the most significant relationship]."'' 3 Thus, although this rule
places paramount importance on the forum's policies of judicial econ-
omy and integrity, it also contains an escape clause for exceptional
circumstances. An action can be maintained even though barred at
the forum if an alternate forum is unavailable or extremely incon-
109. Locke, supra note 16, at 435.
110. Grossman, supra note 9, at 40.
111. Restatement (Second) § 142 (Supp. 1987) (proposed revision).
112. Id. at § 142(1).
113. Id. at § 142(2)(a).
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venient. 114 By way of example, the comments suggest an alternate
forum may be unavailable "where jurisdiction could not be obtained
over the defendant in any state other than that of the forum or where
for some reason a judgment obtained in the only other state having
jurisdiction would be unenforceable in other states.""' If an alternate
forum is available, the court may still allow the action that would
be time-barred under the current forum's law if the alternate forum
is too inconvenient. Inconvenience is to be determined by analyzing
the relationship of the parties to the forum and the difference in the
length of the limitation periods.'1 6 When there is no substantial re-
lationship between the forum and the parties and the "difference
[between the limitation periods] is small, say one or two years, there
is a greater likelihood that the forum will disregard the small difference
in policy embodied in the two statutes and permit the parties to
proceed. '"" 7 When the forum's limitation period has not expired, the
proposal generally abrogates the lex fori rule and allows the action
if it is not barred by the state with the most significant relationship." 8
On the other hand, when the state with the most significant relationship
would hold the action prescribed, the forum generally will bar the
action even if such action is timely under the law of the forum."19
Thus, this proposed revision is closely akin to the "separate issue"
approach described above.
LOUISIANA'S RESPONSE
Louisiana adopted a modern approach for multistate cases in
Jagers v. Royal Indemnity Co. ,120 a tort case not involving an issue
of prescription. However, Louisiana courts have refused to extend
such an analysis to issues of liberative prescription. The basis for this
reluctance is easily understood: the courts are constrained by Civil
Code article 10 which codifies the lex fori rule for issues of prescrip-
114. Id. at § 142 comment f.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at § 142(2)(b).
119. Id. In order to dismiss an action as prescribed when the limitation period of
the state with the most significant relationship has expired, § 142(2)(b) also requires
a finding that "maintenance of the action would serve no substantial interest of the
forum" and that "no compelling considerations of remedial justice warrant permitting
the action to be maintained in the forum." Id. at § 142(2)(b)(ii) & (iii).
120. 276 So. 2d 309 (La. 1973). Jagers is discussed in depth in the Torts section
of this symposium.
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tion.121 The Louisiana Second Circuit explained its decision to adhere
to the specific codal provision rather than extending Jagers to pre-
scription in the following way:
Jagers mandates the application of the modern interest analysis
in those circumstances where the choice of law is not specif-
ically governed by statute .... [W]e do not believe that Jagers
held that the modern interest analysis is to be applied when
such an application would effectively nullify a Louisiana stat-
ute which specifically governs the conflicts issue presented.122
Article 10 thus raises an obstacle for Louisiana courts not present in
those states in which the lex fori rule was adopted judicially rather
than legislatively. In those states, abandonment of the lex fori rule
does not require legislative action. As explained by the New Jersey
Supreme Court in Heavner, "[the lex fori rule] is ... judge-made
and may be changed judicially."' 2 3
That article 10 forecloses any modern analysis of liberative pre-
scription in Louisiana is evident in Gierling v. Garner,124 a decision
rendered by the third circuit only a few months after the Louisiana
Supreme Court decision in Jagers. Gierling involved a suit for non-
payment of a promissory note executed by an Indiana resident who
subsequently moved to Louisiana. Since the suit was filed more than
nine years after the note's maturity date, the claim was held barred
by Louisiana's five-year prescriptive period. 25 Due to the transaction's
close association with Indiana, the plaintiff asserted that Jagers re-
quired the application of the unexpired Indiana time period, but the
court found such a contention "untenable" in light of the specific
applicability of the lex fori rule then found in article 3532 of the
Civil Code. 26
In the absence of statutory authority to the contrary, courts in
Louisiana would probably be willing to apply modern analysis to
issues of liberative prescription. In fact, one federal district court
sitting in Louisiana relied on Jagers to apply Georgia's longer two-
year limitation period instead of Louisiana's one-year period for torts.
121. Rabalais, Fifth Circuit Symposium-Conflict of Laws, 22 Loy. L. Rev. 519,
525 (1976). For a discussion of Louisiana's adherence to the lex fori rule prior to
1950, see Comment, Limitation of Actions in the Conflict of Laws, 10 La. L. Rev.
374 (1950).
122. Shaw v. Ferguson, 437 So. 2d 319, 322 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1983) (emphasis
by the court).
123. Heavner v. Uniroyal, Inc., 63 N.J. 130, 135, 305 A.2d 412, 415 (1973).
124. 284 So. 2d 664 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973).
125. Id. at 666.
126. Id.
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Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed this decision
in Wright v. Fireman's Fund Insurance C0.' 27
Wright was a diversity action brought by a Georgia resident against
a bankrupt Louisiana company and its insurer for injuries sustained
in Georgia. The district court followed the Jagers rationale and applied
Georgia's two-year statute of limitations, because Georgia had "the
most significant relationship to the issue in question."' 2 According
to the Fifth Circuit, the district court mistakenly believed that the
repeal of the Louisiana Code of Practice, including its thirteenth
article, left Louisiana without any law or precedent other than Jagers.
To the contrary, this repeal was not intended as an abandonment of
the lex fori rule. 29 The Fifth Circuit held that "Jagers [was] not
intended to apply to questions of prescription," and that Louisiana
still views prescription as a procedural question governed by the law
of the forum. 30 This holding conforms with article 10 of the Civil
Code which, however, the court apparently overlooked.' 3'
If Gierling and Wright had been decided under any of the modern
approaches, the results would probably have been different. In Wright,
the lower court did reach a different result, but without much analysis
of state policies and interests and without indicating any explicit
awareness of either the "controlling jurisdiction" or the "separate
issue" methods as such. According to the Fifth Circuit, the district
court had determined that Georgia had the most significant relationship
to the case. 32 The source of this "most significant relationship" test
is the Restatement (Second), which sets forth the choice-of-law criteria
for tort issues in Sections 6 and 145.33 Based on the principles included
therein, the district court could have soundly determined that the
substantive tort issues would be governed by Georgia law. Georgia
was the place where the alleged tortious activity and the resulting
injury occurred. Additionally, Georgia was the domicile of the plaintiff
and the probable center of the business relationship. Louisiana's only
connection was as the state of incorporation and place of business
of the employer. Detracting from this potential Louisiana interest is
127. 522 F.2d 1376 (5th Cir. 1975).
128. Id. at 1377.
129. Id. at 1378. See supra note 6 for the text of article 13 and an explanation
of its repeal.
130. 522 F.2d at 1378.
131. Rabalais, supra note 123, at 519.
132. 522 F.2d at 1378.
133. Section 6, which provides the general principles that should be considered in
any choice-of-law case, is reproduced supra in note 73. Section 145 contains a list of
relevant contacts to be considered in connection with the Section 6 principles when
dealing with a conflicts case involving tort law.
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the employer's apparent business activity outside Louisiana, as evi-
denced by the work-related accident in Georgia. Thus, under both the
"controlling jurisdiction" and "separate issue" methods, the facts in
Wright could have supported application of Georgia's substantive law.
Under the former, a determination that Georgia was the controlling
state would have been well-founded, and the trial court's application
of the Georgia statute of limitations well supported. Similarly, though
not as clearly, the choice of the longer Georgia limitation period could
be sustained under the "separate issue" method. By adopting a longer
period, Georgia evinced a desire to afford Georgia plaintiffs additional
time to seek judicial relief. 3 4 Since the plaintiff was from Georgia,
Georgia's interest would be advanced by the application of its own
limitation law. On the other hand, Louisiana's shorter one-year period
reflects a policy of protection for its resident defendants. This policy
was not actually implicated in this case. Although the defendant was
a Louisiana-based employer, the true defendant was the employer's
insurance company which had issued an insurance policy that appar-
ently extended coverage to claims by Georgia employees for accidents
occurring in Georgia. Under such circumstances, the defendant in-
surance company could not have justifiably expected that its liability
would be governed exclusively by Louisiana law.'35
134. Georgia's laws, like those of Louisiana and all states, are generally presumed
to be for the benefit of its own citizens. See Currie, supra note 69.
135. In a similar situation, the New York Court of Appeals found that the insurer
must have expected to be subjected to possible liability based on the laws of a state
other than the state where the defendant-insured resided. The case, Miller v. Miller,
22 N.Y.2d 12, 237 N.E.2d 877, 290 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1968), involved a wrongful death
action based on an automobile accident in Maine that resulted in the death of a New
York resident. The defendants, domiciled in Maine at the time of the accident, sub-
sequently moved to New York. The conflict of laws involved a damage limitation
statute. Maine limited damages to $20,000, but New York had no such limit. Although
Miller involved damage limitations rather than statutes of limitations, both types of
statutes affect liability: Maine's damage limitation limited liability to $20,000, and
Louisiana's statute of limitations bars the suit. In each case, application of the law
of the state other than that of the insured's residence would have subjected the insurer
to greater potential liability. Thus, the following discussion by the Miller court of the
insurer's expectations should be pertinent to the expectations of an insurer such as
the one in Wright:
The insurer may have expected that Maine's limitation on death recoveries
would apply to accidents in Maine. But here in determining whether any
unfairness will result by virtue of the application of New York law, he may
also consider the fact that the policy was not ... limited to affording
protection only to accidents occurring in the State of Maine . . . and that,
therefore, the possibility of liability in excess of $20,000 was certainly not
unexpected and was insured against.
22 N.Y.2d at 21, 237 N.E.2d at 882, 290 N.Y.S.2d at 741.
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Gierling involved a suit on a promissory note executed in Indiana
by an Indiana resident 3 6 in favor of an Indiana corporation. 3 7 After
the note's maturity date, the defendant moved to Louisiana. 3 1 Past
due by over nine years, the note was negotiated from the Indiana
payee to the Louisiana plaintiff, who immediately filed suit. 3 9 Re-
jecting the plaintiff's contention that Indiana's ten-year limitation
period applied, the court held that the suit was barred by Louisiana's
five-year prescriptive period. 40 According to the Louisiana Civil Code,
the substantive issues would be controlled by the law of Indiana, since
the note was executed and intended to have effect in Indiana.' 4'
Therefore, under the "controlling jurisdiction" method, Indiana would
be the controlling state and its ten-year period would govern.
Under the Gierling facts, the "separate issue" method could yield
a decision applying the statute of limitations of either Indiana or
Louisiana. When the payee and maker were both domiciled in Indiana,
each intended and expected Indiana's statute of limitations to control.
Had litigation ensued at this point, this would have been a fully
domestic case governed solely by the law of Indiana; no choice-of-
law issue would have existed. When the maker moved to Louisiana,
a conflicts issue arose. 42 If the original payee had instituted legal
136. 284 So. 2d at 666.
137. Plaintiff's Original Brief on the Merits at 2. (Because Civil Code article 10
requires no analysis of the interests of the concerned states, the court's opinion omitted
certain facts that may be relevant to a modern analysis.)
138. Id.
139. Id. It is not evident from the court's opinion that the plaintiff was a Louisiana
resident, that the plaintiff was not the original payee, or that the original payee was
an Indiana corporation.
140. Id.
141. The note was executed in Indiana between Indiana parties. The maker was to
make payments at a designated place in Indiana. Thus, under the following paragraphs
of Louisiana Civil Code article 10 the action on the note would have been governed
by Indiana law:
The form and effect of public and private written instruments are governed
by the laws and usages of the places where they are passed or executed.
But the effect of acts passed in one country to have effect in another
country, is regulated by the laws of the country where such acts are to have
effect.
Since the note was made and intended to be paid in Indiana, the note was intended
to have effect in Indiana.
142. At this point, the fact situation is similar to that found in Davis v. Colvin,
410 So. 2d 1211 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982). In Davis, a Pennsylvania resident sued a
Louisiana resident on an open account that resulted from purchases made when the
plaintiff was domiciled in Pennsylvania. However, in this case the Pennsylvania statute
of limitations provided a shorter period (4 years) than that of Louisiana (5 years).
Id. at 1212. Relying on article 3532 (now contained within article 10) of the Louisiana
Civil Code, the court barred the action which would have been barred under either
state's statute. Id.
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proceedings at this time, both Indiana and Louisiana could have
asserted an interest in the litigation. Indiana's adoption of a ten-year
limitation period exhibited a policy of allowing its residents a fairly
long time to seek recovery. To the contrary, Louisiana's five-year
period offered more protection to resident defendants. Faced with this
situation, a Louisiana court might bar the claim, especially since the
defendant is now a Louisiana resident and Louisiana's interest in
avoiding "state" claims is implicated.
A closer analysis of the state interests, however, may reveal that
applying the longer Indiana statute would advance Indiana's interests
without seriously frustrating Louisiana's policies. Because the note was
executed in Indiana with payments to be made therein, the payee did
not expect and the maker could not justifiably expect any law but
that of Indiana to control. Thus, the application of Indiana's limitation
period would advance Indiana's plaintiff-oriented policies and fulfill
the parties' reasonable expectations. Furthermore, Louisiana may not
have an interest in protecting a resident defendant who has implicitly
but voluntarily chosen the law of another state by incurring an ob-
ligation virtually unrelated to Louisiana. Nonetheless, Louisiana's pol-
icy of judicial economy and integrity may tip the balance toward
dismissal unless the plaintiff can prove the unavailability or extreme
inconvenience of an alternate forum.
Instead of himself filing suit in Louisiana, however, the Indiana
payee negotiated the note to the Louisiana plaintiff. If this factor is
viewed as merely fortuitous, the Louisiana transferee's rights will be
identical to those of his Indiana transferor. 143 However, it may be
argued that the transfer of the note altered the interests of the re-
spective states. 144 If so, Indiana's interest in applying its longer lim-
itation period to benefit Indiana plaintiffs dissipates because the plaintiff
is now a Louisiana domiciliary. In this situation, application of Lou-
isiana law will be supported by Louisiana's interest in protecting a
Louisiana defendant-at least when the application of Louisiana's
shorter prescriptive period does not frustrate the policies of another
143. The plaintiff's position was that the negotiation of the note and the change
of domicile by the defendant were irrelevant. Urging the court to extend Jagers to
issues of prescription, the plaintiff argued that Indiana's law should control: "It is
apparent that the interests of the State of Indiana dominate here because of [the facts
relating to Indiana].... [T]he most weighty factor in [the plaintiff's] view is that
when the parties executed this note they expected that the laws of Indiana would
apply." Plaintiff's Original Brief on the Merits at 3.
144. The view of the defendant was that the change in circumstances negated any
Indiana interest: "[Defendant-]Appellant submits that [the Jagers] case does not over-
rule the lex fori rule in Louisiana, but that even in applying the test [of Jagers], the
law of Louisiana should govern a dispute between one Louisiana resident and another."
Defendant's Reply Brief at 1.
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state-and also by the fact that application of Louisiana's shorter
prescriptive period will advance Louisiana's policies of protecting ju-
dicial integrity and preserving judicial economy.
As the foregoing analysis reveals, decisions based on Civil Code
article 10 are often contrary to those which would be reached under
the modern approaches. Under both modern approaches, the Wright
court could have applied Georgia's limitation period to further Geor-
gia's policies without impairing Louisiana's policies. Yet, article 10
precluded such a result. This is the problem with article 10. It produces
acceptable results only randomly and often for the wrong reasons. 45
CONCLUSION
The lex fori rule and the borrowing provision in Civil Code article
10 may require the choice of limitation laws of a state that is not
substantially interested in the prescriptive issue. Adoption of a modern
approach to choice-of-law prescription issues will allow Louisiana
courts to decide cases in a manner that more fully conforms to the
policies of the interested states and the justified expectations of the
parties. Two modern alternatives have been presented. The "control-
ling jurisdiction" method, implemented in the Heavner decision and
the Uniform Conflict of Laws-Limitations Act, applies the limitation
period of the state whose law governs the substantive issues.146 The
"separate issue" method, utilized in Air Products and arguably the
proposed revision to the Restatement (Second), treats liberative pre-
scription as a distinct issue to be analyzed separately under the forum's
choice-of-law approach for other issues.
It is recommended that the lex fori rule and the borrowing pro-
visions contained in Civil Code article 10 be replaced with a statutory
adoption of the more flexible "separate issue" approach. Instead of
limiting the forum to the law of the controlling state, this method
allows the forum to make its choice of law on the basis of the policies
and interests of each state involved. 47 This approach is preferable
because it provides the courts with the discretion necessary to address
145. The analysis of Gierling illustrates that a decision made in compliance with
article 10 may coincide with one made under the "separate issue" method. However,
the acceptability of the article 10 results is merely coincidental. Similarly, the lex fori
rule can reach the same result as the "controlling jurisdiction" method, but only if
a borrowing statute is applicable, an escape clause is invoked, or if the forum is the
controlling jurisdiction.
146. See supra text accompanying notes 78-101.
147. See supra text accompanying notes 102-10.
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the wide range of interests that can arise from varying fact patterns. 48
Dana Patrick Karam
148. The advantages of granting this discretion to the courts were expanded upon
by Grossman, supra note 9, at 42:
Indeed, the judiciary's role in preventing forum shopping may be the more
important because legislatures often may not foresee the problems involved
in conflict-of-laws litigation. Nor is it necessarily more appropriate for the
legislature to dictate choice-of-law rules, even if a legislature anticipates the
need for those rules. Courts, repeatedly faced with cases presenting varied
fact situations, may be better suited to fashion those rules in accordance
with fairness and justice. Courts make choice-of-law rules in other legal
areas, and statutes of limitations do not seem to require special treatment.
In addition, the judicial imposition of borrowing, flexible as it is, avoids
many of the problems of incompleteness and indefiniteness raised by bor-
rowing statutes. The court can tailor its decisionmaking to the facts of each
case, borrowing a foreign statute of limitations only when the result would
be equitable and just.
